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1. INTRODUCTION
What general guidelines should fiscal policy
follow in the new setting where Portugal has
joined the group of countries founding the single
currency? Should this policy continue to focus on
the reference values for the deficit and debt as es-
tablished in the Treaty, which provided the crite-
rion for accession to that group? Or should other
figures be used instead? Other reasons apart, the
sole existence of the Stability and Growth Pact for
the period post-1999, with the accompanied sanc-
tions for indisciplined public finances, indicates by
itself that the interest for fiscal discipline is not
confined to the moment countries are selected for
integrating the core founding the euro.
In this paper, we shall discuss these questions.
Section 2 starts by identifying the main attributes
of what might be considered a steady-state of
economy, to be attained in the long-run, leaving
aside for a while the problem of adjustment or
transition to that situation. In this initial section,
we stress the required consistency — or mutual
compatibility — between the long-run reference
values for budget and for public debt. Section 3
tackles the problem of cyclical fluctuations around
the steady-state. In this context, we propose a rule
for fixing the budget balance, that ensures the sta-
bility of the chosen long-run solution in the pres-
ence of perturbations affecting the economy. The
specific form suggested for the rule solves, in turn,
the transition problem since it ensures simulta-
neously the convergence from the initial situation
to the long-run reference values. As a means of il-
lustration, section 4 applies the methodology sug-
gested in the previous section to the Portuguese
case, stressing the fiscal effort required in the tran-
sition period. Section 5 compares our results with
those of alternative specifications. Finally, section
6 concludes.
2. COMPATIBILITY OF OBJECTIVES
How to define a long-run steady-state in the
euro regime from the viewpoint of the budget and
public debt? The following features should neces-
sarily be among the minimum requirements:
1. The public debt to GDP ratio, represented
by b=BY / , where B and Y stand respec-
tively for the stock of public debt and GDP,
should be stabilized. This is a simple cor-
ollary of the concept of steady-state(1), which
assumes that the relevant variables are sta-
ble at their final equilibrium levels.
2. The steady-state value of b at which such
stabilization takes place in the long-run
should not surpass the 60 per cent threshold.
This is the limitation imposed by the Treaty.
Since this is an upper bound, the problem of
knowing what should be the specific value
(inside this limit) that better fits our budget-
ary policy arises. Therefore, the choice of
such reference value — to which the public
debt ratio must converge in the long-run —
appears as one of the basic options present
in the analysis that follows.
Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / June 1998 45
Articles
* The opinions of the paper represent the views of the author,
and are not necessarily those of the Banco de Portugal.
** Banco de Portugal and Universidade Nova de Lisboa. The au-
thor thanks Victor Gaspar and Jorge Correia da Cunha for com-
ments and suggestions.
(1) Note, however, that this is not strictly a necessary condition for
dynamic sustainability. Indeed, dynamic sustainability requires
only that b grows at a rate smaller than the difference between
the interest rate and the growth rate of the economy.3. Medium-run budgetary positions must be
close to balance or in surplus. Though not
very precise in quantitative terms, this is a
constraint imposed by the Pact.
4. The overall deficit as a percentage of GDP,
hereafter represented by f, should not sur-
pass the 3 per cent threshold at each mo-
ment. This, too, is a constraint imposed by
the Treaty, and takes the form of an upper
limit.
We should start by identifying the options
available regarding the long-run reference values
for public debt and deficit, within the above con-
straints.
To what values should the debt ratio b and the
overall public deficit f be forced to converge,
through the continued implementation of budget-
ary policy during the transitional stage?
A first key aspect to bear in mind in choosing
the long-run reference values for the debt and def-
icit ratios is that these choices are not independent,
but interrelated. Under these circumstances, the
mutual compatibility of values chosen is essential,
since the fiscal policy designed may prove inter-
nally inconsistent otherwise.
It can be shown that the public debt to GDP ra-
tio b evolves approximately according to the fol-
lowing expression(2):
() Db d b =+ - + -1 iy u , (1)
where, for annual data, Db indicates the annual
change in the ratio b, d stands for the primary defi-
cit (as a percentage of GDP) in the respective year
and term () b- - 1 iy is the debt ratio at the end of
the previous year b-1 times the difference between
the nominal interest rate i (that the State pays in
debt) and the nominal GDP growth rate, y. the re-
sidual term u reflects the effect of other non-fiscal
impulses on the dynamics of debt — e.g., those re-
sulting from revenue due to privatisation opera-
tions, or from public liabilities — whether explicit
or implicit — in the Health, Social Security, guar-
anteed debt, financial system, etc. These impulses
were not considered in the simulation, due to the
inaccuracy of the available estimates, and also be-
cause some of these have opposing algebraic signs,
hence partly cancelling out each other.
The stabilization of ratio b in a steady-state
means a null change, Db = 0, thus (1) yields:
() 0 =d b +- iy , (2)
whered andb stand for the stabilized long-run val-
ues ford and b.
Considering in turn that this is the steady-state
of a small open economy, integrated in a wide Eu-
ropean area with a single monetary policy, specifi-
cation (2) can be further specialised. Indeed, under
these circumstances we can admit that some of
these parameters will be essentially exogenous.
For instance, the growth rate of nominal GDP is
basically equal to the sum of European inflation(3)
p* to the growth of domestic real potential output,
q* — two variables that for distinct reasons are dif-
ficult to be influenced by domestic authorities.
Thus, we admit that y equals exogenous value y*,
given by:
yqp *** . =+ (3)
Likewise, in such a framework it seems likely
that the nominal interest rate should be considered
also exogenous:
ii = * (4)
Therefore, only two non-exogenous variables
remain in our specification, the primary deficit d
and ratio b:
() 0 =d b +- iy ** , (5)
In turn, the following definitional relationship
between primary deficit and overall deficit should
hold in the long-run:
f=d b + i *, (6)
where f stands for overall deficit in the long-run.
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(2) See Blanchard (1997), p.596. For the exact formula see for exam-
ple Barbosa (1997), p.131. (3) Samuelson-Balassa-type effects are here being disregarded.Expressions (6) and (7) reveal the mutual com-
patibility relationships that must necessarily pre-
vail in the long-run: once known the interest rate i*
and the nominal growth rate of the economy y*,
and once chosen a reference value for any of the
three variables b, f or d, the remaining two vari-
ables are residually determined(4).
Diagram 1 illustrates this independence and the
need for a consistent set of long-term targets, as-
suming a nominal growth rate of the Portuguese
economy of 5 per cent and a nominal interest rate
of 5.5 per cent(5).
Suppose that the direct choice made by the fis-
cal authority regards the public debt to GDP ratio
b, measured in the horizontal axis in diagram. The
vertical axis indicates the compatible values for
the overall and primary deficit. The upward slop-
ing line stands for the overall deficit consistent
with the value for b chosen in the horizontal axis,
and is given by (7):
f=by *, (8)
while the downward sloping line refers to the cor-
responding primary deficit, given by (5):
() d=b - yi
** . (9)
Since this line indicates negative values, these rep-
resent primary surpluses. Lastly, the horizontal
line indicates the 3 per cent of GDP threshold the
Treaty and the Stability Pact establishes for the
overall deficit.
Choosing for instance a reference value of 60
per cent for the debt ratio, points a and a’ indicate
the corresponding long-run values for primary
and overall deficit — in this case, -0.3 per cent (a
surplus) and 3 per cent, respectively. b and b’ indi-
cate the values for the primary and overall deficit
corresponding to a debt ratio of b = 40 per cent,
while points c and c’ are associated to a 20 per cent
ratio. Note again that primary surpluses are re-
quired in the long-run, independently of the
choice of b. Also note that a balanced budget
(f=0) requires in the long-run that the public
debt ratio is null (b=0), as well as the primary
balance (d=0).
Table 1 exhibits the compatible values for pri-
mary deficit d and overall deficit f for several al-
ternative choices ofb.
As shown, a primary surplus emerges in all
cases, except when the public debt ratio in
steady-state is null. In this case, both the overall
balance and the primary balance are also null(6).
Once acknowledged the need for a consistent
set of long-run objectives for the three key vari-
ables — debt ratio, overall balance and primary
balance — another question rises: what additional
criteria beyond consistency should guide choice?
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Diagram 1
COMPATIBLE VALUES FOR DEBT, OVERALL




















(4) These results illustrate a conclusion previously advanced by
other authors (e.g., W. Buiter (1993)): In a steady-state one and
only one specific value for the nominal GDP growth rate y* is
bound to ensure the strict compliance to the two Treaty refer-
ence values.
(5) For a 2 per cent inflation rate, these values imply a real growth
rate of 3 per cent and a 3.5 per cent real interest rate.
(6) The low value obtained for the primary balance in the various
scenarios is a consequence of having admitted quite similar
values for the interest rate i* and for output growth y*.
Table 1
COMPATIBLE STEADY-STATE VALUES
FOR i = 5.5% AND y=5%
b=60% b=40% b=30% b=20% b=0%
d -0.3 -0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.0
f 3.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.0This is a complex issue, due to the manifold impli-
cations, some of which not confined to the eco-
nomic sphere. In what follows, nevertheless, we
discuss one of the most relevant aspects to this is-
sue: the implications of this choice in the context of
the constraints imposed by the Stability Pact and
the Excessive Deficit Procedure on the budgetary
variables and debt. This is the objective of the fol-
lowing analysis.
3. CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS
Even with a consistent set of objectives for in
the long-run, an additional complication must be
considered: the effects of the cyclical fluctuations
of the economy around that steady-state equilib-
rium. Indeed, budgets depend on the economic cy-
cle, tending to worsen when production slows
down and to improve when production acceler-
ates. It is through this reaction of the budget to the
cycle that “automatic stabilizers” operate. These
represent a positive feature as it helps to attenuate
the cyclical fluctuations in the economy.
Being a positive feature, “automatic stabiliza-
tion” should at the least be preserved in the future
design of fiscal policy. At the least, in the sense
that with the loss of the exchange rate and mone-
tary instruments, stabilization of asymmetric
shocks will become virtually confined to the fiscal
sphere.
In this context, how should the preservation
of automatic stabilizers — and the fluctuations in
the budget balance they imply — be made com-
patible with the deficit and debt limits resulting
from the Treaty and the Pact? The obvious sugges-
tion is to adjust the reference values to levels suffi-
ciently below those limits, so that these thresholds
are not crossed when negative cyclical fluctuations
occur. More specifically, in what concerns the bud-
get balance this implies that the overall deficit
should be calibrated to a reference value below the
3 per cent threshold, so that when the economy
decelerates the deficit is allowed to rise automati-
cally (due to the stabilization mechanism) without
triggering sanctions.
What value below 3 per cent should therefore
be chosen?
Before answering to this question, a prelimi-
nary issue should be mentioned. One may ask
whether the suggested reduction on the steady-
state deficit to levels below 3 per cent would not
bring negative consequences to aggregate demand
— more specifically, a sustained reduction in its
value, yielding systematic depressing effects on
output and employment. It is our belief that a re-
duction of this kind cannot yield a chronic effect to
aggregate demand. In the long-run — that which
concerns the present analysis — the assumption of
price flexibility must be taken into account, which
implies that aggregate demand should equate
equilibrium output. The sustained reduction of
deficit may result in adjustments in composition of
aggregate demand, but not in a reduction in its to-
tal value.
Returning to the issue of what should be the
specific value for the budget that provides a refer-
ence to fiscal policy, let us consider the primary
deficitd broken-down into the following parts:
dd =+ z (10)
where d is its average steady-state value (as a per-
centage of GDP) and z is the cyclical deviation
from d. Component z is therefore a stochastic vari-
able, possibly exhibiting serial correlation, which
depends on the cyclical position of the economy.
So z can be written as follows:
z A L cycle = () , (11)
where A (L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L.
In turn, cycle is a stationary variable following a
path described by
cycle B L = (), e (12)
B (L) being a polynomial in the lag operator and e
an impulse with E( e ) = 0 and Var() es e =
2. When
output is sustainably at its equilibrium steady-
state value cycle = 0, z will take its zero
steady-state value. Thus, z is a stochastic variable
with zero steady-state mean Ez () = 0, and
steady-state variance s z
2 . In turn, the overall defi-
cit equals:
fdb d b =+ =++ -- 11 iz i ** . (13)
Assume in this decomposition that the major
source of variability in f, in the steady-state, origi-
nates in the cyclical component of the economy,
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in the interest expenditure is negligible in the con-
text of our description of steady-state (due to the
presumably stable behaviour of b, or the low vola-
tility of i*), so that bi * basically behaves as a con-
stant.
In this setting, the first question arising when
attempting to design an appropriate rule for fixing
each period the primary balance in the steady-
state is that of the stability of the steady-state solu-
tion itself.
Consider the dynamic equation for debt previ-
ously indicated in (1), evaluated around the
steady-state:
() Db d b ==++ - 0 zi y ** .
Rearranging slightly, the deviations from the
steady-state can be written as follows:
() [] bd b =++ + - - zi y 1 1* * . (14)
Note that the dynamics of b around the steady-
state will be unstable when the coefficient forb-1 is
greater than one — i.e., when iy ** , > which hap-
pens under the current numerical assumption i
=0.055 and y* = 0.05.(7). This suggests the need for
introducing a corrective term in the rule for fixing
the primary balance, which may stabilise the dy-
namic behaviour of b, without however affecting
the stationary expected value d. As we shall see
below this corrective term will simultaneously
force the convergence of b to its steady-state value.
Therefore, we propose that the planned value for d
at each period should be described by the follow-
ing expression:
() () dd l bb =+ + - -- Ez |. W 11(15)
In this expression, () Ez |W -1 stands for the ex-
pected value of the cyclical deficit in the period,
conditioned on the information available in the
previous period, W -1. Therefore, this term repre-
sents the anticipated dynamics in the primary def-
icit — i.e., the inertia component of its behaviour.
Its inclusion indicates that we want to allow for
the automatic stabilizers to operate(8) — an opera-
tional attribute that, as referred above, is highly
desirable. In turn,
() ql bb l =- < £ -1 01 (16)
is the correcting term in the dynamic behaviour of
b, which will be stabilising if l is appropriately
chosen. Indeed, substituting rule (15) into (14)
yields the dynamics around the steady-state de-
scribed by:
() [] bd b l =++ + - - - zi y 1 1* * , (17)
which is stable provided thatl> - iy ** .
However, a higher value for l may still be pref-
erable. In fact, if l* ³ i , not only stability is
achieved but also an additional result is obtained:
overall debt does not worsen whenb suffers an ex-
ogenous shock (increase). Indeed, by including the
corrective term (16) in the primary deficit, the
overall deficit expressed in (13) can be rewritten as
follows:
fd l bb b =++ - + -- zi () * 11
() =++ - - dl b l - b zi *, 1 (18)
which, with l* ³ i ensures that an unexpected
worsening of b-1 does not worsen the overall defi-
cit in the following period — a result which may
be of interest for fiscal policy design(9).
4. AN EXAMPLE
We shall refer to the Portuguese historical expe-
rience to illustrate a strategy of the type just sug-
gested. Diagram 2 summarizes the basic ingredi-
ents of this strategy.
Our first concern refers to the description of the
dynamic behaviour of the cyclical component, that
is, the estimation of polynomial B (L). Therefore,
we started by measuring the cycle applying the
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(7) This is the only relevant case, since the inverse relation i*<y*
implies dynamic inefficiency in the economy. See for example
Blanchard and Fisher (1989).
(8) Recall that the unconditional expected value of z is zero.
(9) In turn, comparing the value of overall deficit in (18) with its
steady-state level f, and ignoring the cycle term yields:
() () ff l b b -= - - - i * 1 (19)
which shows that, with l* ³i and bb - > 1 , the overall deficit
converges to its long-run level from below.() HP -= filter l 100 to real output in logarithms,
obtained from the Historical Series for the Portu-
guese Economy of the Banco de Portugal(10).W e
then proceeded to determining the dynamic mod-
elling of the cycle. This stage, represented in Dia-
gram 2 by steps 1 and 2, was used also to estimate
the sequence of impulses driving the cycle and the
propagation mechanism. The chosen model esti-
mated for the period 1977-1996 has the following
specification(11):
cycle cycle cycle =+ + - - aa e 11 22 , (20)
yielding the following estimate (t-values in brack-
ets):
cycle cycle cycle =- +
-
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Normality tests were applied to the residuals e
and this hypothesis was not rejected(12). Next 2000
random numbers were drawn from a normal pop-
ulation, with zero mean and variance equal to that
of e(13). With these numbers and the propagation
mechanism indicated in (21) it was possible to ob-
tain out of sample simulations of the cycle.
In addition, the relationship between the pri-
mary balance and the cycle (step 3 in Diagram 2)
was taken into account with the following simple
specification, which revealed some adherence to
the period 1986-1996(14):
dag g h =+ + + - 1 2 1 cycle cycle (22)
The left-hand side is the previously used vari-
able d. The second and third terms in the
right-hand side reflect the cyclical influence on the
balance, possibly with a lag. Hence, coefficients g 1
and g 2 reflect the sensitivity of the primary deficit
to the cycle and the estimated values were used in
the simulations.




=+ - + - 001 0477 0429 1 .. . cycle cycle (23)
Rs e e Q
2 047 001 25061 == = .. . . . ( . )
The size and sign of the coefficient g 2 suggest a
partial correction factor, after one year(16). Accord-
ing to (15) and given the estimated coefficients for
g 1 and g 2, the control instrument — i.e., the
planned primary balance — was defined as:
() dd l bb =+ - + - -- 0477 0429 11 .. . cycle cycle (24)
Here, as previously noted, d and b should be
compatible values. Furthermore, the choice of the
coefficient l requires caution. On the one hand, l
should be great enough, as mentioned, to ensure
at the least dynamic stability(17). On the other
hand, an excessively high value, given the differ-
50 Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / June 1998
Articles
(10)The series was stretched to comprise years from 1994 to 2000,
using estimates of the Banco de Portugal.
(11)This analysis was limited to the period running from 1977 to
1996 due to the conviction (supported by some evidence) that
the cycle dynamics in this period was different from that in the
previous years.
(12)Bowman-Shenton test, with result c
2(2) 0.062[0.97] = .
(13)A bootstrap analysis was also carried out using historical resid-
uals e. However, given the limited sample, the density function
found through this procedure was particularly jagged.
(14)If the primary balance exerts simultaneously a significant con-
temporary influence on the cycle, the contemporary sensitivity
of the balance vis-à-vis the cycle may be overestimated. This
being the case, the conclusions below on the risk of violating
the 3 per cent threshold for the deficit due to cyclical fluctua-
tions may be overcautious. Nevertheless, alternative specifica-
tions are considered below.
(15)See below the discussion of alternative specifications.
(16)A conjecture consistent with this result would be that, after an
improvement in the budgetary balance in a given year (for cy-
clical reasons) fiscal authorities would tend to relax fiscal disci-
pline in the following year. Conversely, a deficit worsening in a
given year is followed by a pressure towards greater fiscal con-
trol in the next year. Being systematic, this discretionary behav-
iour of authorities would become an additional component of
the automatic stabilising mechanism, hence attenuating the im-
pact of the latter. If this conjecture is valid, then the application
of the Stability Pact may lead to the future elimination of this
behaviour and the resulting amplification of the impact of con-
ventional automatic stabilisers.
(17)According to (17), stability is attained if l> - iy ** , which in the
present case requires l>0 005 .
Diagram 2
THE MODEL
Shocks CYCLE PRIMARY BALANCE
12 3ence between the initial value of b and its
steady-state value may imply an initial effort of
adjustment of such magnitude that its implemen-
tation becomes politically infeasible.
In the simulation below, and considering that
the initial level ofb (its value in 1996) is around 67
per cent(18), four alternative values were consid-
ered forl (19): 2.5%, 4.0%, 5.5 % and 7%.
In turn, four alternative hypothesis were con-
sidered for the steady-state debt ratio:
b=40 30 20 0 %, %, % % and . The corresponding
steady-state values for primary and overall defi-
cits which are compatible with those figures were
presented in table 1.
Chart 1 depicts historical values up to 1996, to-
gether with a simulation of the overall and pri-
mary balances up to year 2030, with b=30% cho-
sen for the steady-state value of the debt to GDP
ratio. The correcting term parameter l was fixed
at 3.5%.
The behaviour of the cyclically-adjusted over-
all balance reflects the reduction in interest expen-
diture. This is due to the sustained reduction of
the debt ratio, from its initial value () b96 67 = % to
the steady-state level b=30%. Sometimes the
overall balance exceeds the three per cent thresh-
old, although the probability of such event is not
constant through time.
It is therefore of great interest to know the
probability of violating the threshold, measured
as the percentage of time, for a give horizon, for
which overall deficit f exceeds the 3 per cent
limit. Attempts to calculate this probability were
made in the simulations below. Since in all the
scenarios analysed the ratiob decreases over time,
from its initial value in 1996 to its steady-state
level, interest expenditure decrease alongside the
former, and the probability of surpassing the limit
will thus tend to fall over time, until reaching a fi-
nal value in the steady-state. On the other hand,
however, the influence of the “initial conditions”
must be taken into account in what concerns the
cycle. Here the influence is contrary to the one of
the debt: the initial cyclical position in 1996 is
such that it allows us to foresee a positive contribu-
tion to the primary balance in the forthcoming
years. This means that the term () Ez |W 96 in (15) is
positive in the near future. This point is illustrated
in chart 2, which describes the expected value of
the cycle in the forthcoming years.
The long-term equilibrium value of zero for this
term explains why, on this account, the probability
of violating the limit is lower in the near future,
tending to increase with time afterwards. Lastly,
there is still the possibility that a very strong bud-
getary effort at the beginning results in such a dras-
tic budget reduction that the deficit is promptly di-
minished to a level below its long-run equilibrium
(see footnote 9), approaching this level from lower
values. If this happens, the probability of surpass-
ing the boundary shall tend to increase over time.
In view of this set of possibly contradictory ef-
fects, it would be interesting to calculate such prob-
ability for four distinct horizons: 2005, 2015, 2025,
and only as a reference the stationary probability
(infinite horizon)(20). 1,000 simulations for the be-
haviour of overall balance were made for each ho-
rizon (and for each value of l and b). For each sim-
ulation the percentage of periods wheref>3% was
calculated, and finally the average of those percent-
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Chart 1
OVERALL AND PRIMARY BALANCE
bl == 03 0025 ., .












(18)This was the best available estimate at the time simulations
were ran (September 1997). In measuring gross debt, accumu-
lated capitalised interest of saving certificates and CEDEP
(sinking fund related to the payment of interest on
capitalisation bonds) were excluded.
(19)See previous discussion around expression (18).
(20)The limit situation (infinite horizon) corresponding to
steady-state probability was calculated by approximation: we
considered an hypothetical horizon, sufficient long to eliminate
completely any trace of the influence of initial conditions.ages was computed. Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 present
the results.
The following general conclusions can be
drawn from an analysis of the tables:
a) The probability of violating the 3 per cent
threshold (for overall deficit) does not
evolve uniformly over time in all scenarios.
Indeed, it tends to increase in some scenar-
ios, while decreasing in others. This is basi-
cally a consequence of the choice of the in-
tervention coefficient l: as reported(21) the
overall deficit tends to converge to its long-
-term value from below when
() l> = ii *, * 0.05 , and from above whenever
l<i *. Hence the probability of violating the
threshold will tend to rise over time in the
first case, decreasing in the second case.
b) For a given horizon, the greater the correct-
ing budgetary effort — given by the term
() lb b - -1 in (15) — the lower the probabil-
ity of violating the threshold. In turn, the
greater the value of the intervention coeffi-
cient l and the more ambitious (i.e., the
lower) the target for the steady-state debt ra-
tiob, the greater the required effort.
The tables suggest that the probability of violat-
ing the 3 per cent ceiling can be substantial in
some scenarios. For example, if the objective is to
lower the debt to 40 per cent of GDP in the
long-run, and if the intervention coefficient equals
2.5 per cent, the overall deficit will, on average,
surpass the ceiling in 3 years until year 2005 (38
per cent of the 9 years from 1997 up to 2005).
However, this frequency can be lowered to 2 years
if the intervention coefficient rises to l=4%.
Therefore, reducing the probability of violating the
budgetary ceiling to small values may require a
significant value for the intervention coefficientl.
However, since one would expect that the in-
crease of the corrective budgetary effort — given
by term () lb b - -1 in (15) — is associated with
greater political difficulties in implementation, it is
interesting to evaluate what this effort means in
quantitative terms. We thus estimated the mean
value of the corrective budgetary effort to be car-
ried out in forthcoming years — i.e. up to year
2010 — in 6 distinct scenarios. Coefficient l takes
one of three possible values: 4%, 5.5% and 7%,
while the long-run value for debt ratio b is either
30% or 20%. Table 6 presents the measure of the
required fiscal effort, in percentage points of GDP.
The figures in each cell are the mean value of
1,000 simulations of the cycle. The table shows that
the required financial effort declines slowly in
time, as a result of the progressive reduction in the
debt ratio and in its gap vis-à-vis its steady-state
level. Note that the budgetary effort here consid-
ered represents, according to rule (15), only one
out of the three elements necessary for planning
the primary balance. The remaining two are the
(compatible) steady-state value for primary deficit
d in table 1, and the term representing the antici-
pated cyclical component of the balance, () Ez |W -1
which enables the functioning of the automatic
stabilizers(22).
The results now obtained are obviously consis-
tent with those presented in the previous tables,
and hence they link the budgetary effort to the
probability of surpassing the deficit threshold.
Thus, for example, for a long-run objective forb of
30 per cent, and fixing l at 4 per cent, the budget-
ary effort for 1997 would be 1.48 per cent of GDP.
Moreover, in this case we have d = -0.0015. Given
the initial conditions for the cycle,













(21)See (19) in footnote 9.
(22)Only to some extent, it should be said, since the correction term
represented by the fiscal effort — of a contractionary nature —
can possibly cancel this effect.cycle cycle 96 95 0 01694 0 02015 =- =- .. and and using
(21) the estimate for the cycle position in 1997 is:
() [] E cycle 97 96 00081 |. . W= -
With this result and the value of cycle 96 in (23), we
may obtain the anticipated cyclical position of the
primary balance:
() ( ) ( ) Ez |. . . . . . W 96 0 477 0 0081 0 429 0 01694 0 0034 =- -- =
The primary deficit planned for 1997 in this inter-
vention scenario thus equals:
() () dd l bb =+ + -




00015 00034 00148 00129
that is, a primary surplus amounting to about 1.3
percentage points of GDP.
5. ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS
In the previous analysis the possibility of an in-
fluence from the budget to the cycle was disre-
garded. However, this possibility should be exam-
ined for two reasons: first, if this causality exists,
the estimates for the sensitivity of the balance to
the cycle in regression (23) are biased; second, in
the simulations with alternative intervention sce-
narios (e.g., different values for coefficient l) the
impact of these interventions on the cycle itself
would have to be included, instead of considering
the cycle as an exogenous element.
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Table 2
PROBABILITY OF OVERALL DEFICIT ABOVE 3%
Public debt (steady-state)=40% GDP
b=04 .
2005 2015 2025 ¥
l=0 025 . 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.16
l=00 4 . 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.16
l=0 055 . 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16
l=00 7 . 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.16
Table 3
PROBABILITY OF OVERALL DEFICIT ABOVE 3%
Public debt (steady-state)=30% PIB
b=03 .
2005 2015 2025 ¥
l=0 025 . 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.06
l=00 4 . 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.06
l=0 055 . 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
l=00 7 . 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06
Table 4
PROBABILITY OF OVERALL DEFICIT ABOVE 3%
Public debt (steady-state)=20% PIB
b=02 .
2005 2015 2025 ¥
l=0 025 . 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.02
l=00 4 . 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.02
l=0 055 . 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
l=00 7 . 0.0 0.01 0.01 0.02
Table 5
PROBABILITY OF OVERALL DEFICIT ABOVE 3%
Public debt (steady-state)=0% PIB
b=0
2005 2015 2025 ¥
l=0 025 . 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.0
l=00 4 . 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0
l=0 055 . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
l=00 7 . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 6
REQUIRED BUDGETARY EFFORT: () lb b - -1
As a percentage of GDP
b=30% b=20%
l=4% l=55 .% l=7% l=4% l=55 .% l=7%
1997 1.48 2.03 2.59 1.88 2.58 3.29
1998 1.41 1.91 2.39 1.80 2.43 3.05
1999 1.35 1.79 2.21 1.72 2.29 2.83
2000 1.29 1.69 2.04 1.64 2.15 2.62
2001 1.24 1.60 1.90 1.59 2.04 2.44
2002 1.20 1.52 1.79 1.53 1.94 2.28
2003 1.16 1.45 1.68 1.49 1.86 2.14
2004 1.13 1.39 1.59 1.44 1.78 2.01
2005 1.09 1.32 1.49 1.39 1.69 1.89
2006 1.05 1.26 1.39 1.34 1.61 1.77
2007 1.01 1.19 1.29 1.29 1.52 1.66
2008 0.97 1.13 1.20 1.24 1.44 1.55
2009 0.93 1.078 1.11 1.20 1.36 1.44
2010 0.90 1.01 1.04 1.15 1.29 1.34However, an analysis of the possible causality
from the budget balance to the cycle does not seem
to provide clear-cut evidence that a significant in-
fluence exists. The equation that follows, esti-
mated for the period running from 1986 up to
1996, does not reveal such influence:
cycle cycle cycle =-+ + -- - 08 9 02 6 03 5 04 2
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The inability to find this direction of causality
can possibly be rationalized in different ways(23).
One of these — frequently referred in similar con-
texts — admits that the budget yields real effects
on the cycle only in the presence of non-
anticipated budget changes. Therefore, in a con-
text of very predictable budgetary changes, with
little innovative content, the balance would render
no significant influence on the level of real activ-
ity.
Anyway, at least as regards the issue of the
budget sensitivity to the cycle and the possible
bias of its estimate(24), alternative hypothesis to the
use of specification (23) should be tested. There-
fore, an alternative specification based upon the
European Commission Procedure was considered,
This procedure uses elasticities to measure the
sensitivity of the budget vis-à-vis the cycle. First,
elasticities are estimated for the different compo-
nents of tax revenue and expenditure, which are
next integrated in an overall elasticity that weights
each of these items(25). The application of the Com-
mission methodology to the Portuguese case pro-
duced the following specification of the cyclical
budget:
cyclicalbudget cycle = 044 . (27)
where the overall coefficient 0.44 corresponds to
the difference between the coefficient of revenue
sensitivity to the cycle (0.34) and that of expendi-
ture (-0.1).
It should be noted in the first place that the cur-
rent methodology does not specify the level of the
budget balance, around which cyclical fluctuations
occur. Hence it can be calibrated to the following
value:
() dl bb +- -1 ,
as done before. Secondly, note that the coefficient
0.44 is quite close to the value which in the previ-
ous specification (23) measures the sensitivity of
budget to the contemporary value of the cycle,
0.48. However, despite a similar contemporaneous
reaction of the balance, the previous specification
also comprised a correcting term in the following
period. Therefore, the implication of this disparity
to the variability of the budget balance should be
considered. Does the Community specification
(27) imply a greater or smaller budget variability
than the previous specification? That is, does it im-
ply a higher or lower probability of surpassing the
3 per cent ceiling?
The variance of the primary balance in the cur-
rent specification is given by:
() ( ) () var . var . d=044
2 cycle (28)
Using (22) and (20) it can be shown that the vari-
ance of the primary balance in the previous speci-
fication is given by(26):



















Despite the fact that the 0.44 coefficient is in-
deed close to coefficient g = 0.48, the presence of
the correcting term in the previous specification
( g 2< 0) helps to lower variance below that yielded
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meaning that the Community method implies a
variability about twofold that previously calcu-
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(23)The same specification, estimated for the longer period (1977 to
1996) still does not indicate unequivocally this influence:
cycle cycle cycle =-+ + -- - 138 0 74 0 22 0 15
82
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(24)See footnote 14.
(25)See European Economy no 60 (1995).
(26)We admit here that the equation (22), as well as (27), are imple-
mented exactly — i.e., with no error term.lated. Therefore, if this method is chosen, the fiscal
policy guidelines should be more rigorous than
those implicit in tables 2, 3, 4 and 5.
As a means of illustration, table 7 shows the
probabilities of exceeding the 3 per cent threshold
forb = 20% using the Community method of simu-
lation of the budget(27). The probabilities calculated
according to this methodology are increased be-
tween 2 and 5 percentage points.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Returning to the questions raised at the begin-
ning, on the major fiscal policy guidelines to be
followed in the context of the monetary union and
the Stability Pact, the following general answers
can be given based upon the previous analysis:
1. The choice of long-run objectives, defined in
terms of primary and overall budget bal-
ances and public debt, should first of all be
mutually consistent.
2. With plausible values admitted for the inter-
est rate and the nominal growth of GDP, this
compatibility requires a virtually balanced
primary account in the long-run.
3. However, in the short- and medium-term,
an additional budgetary effort is required
for the primary balance, to reduce public
debt to significantly lower values. This re-
duction is essential if a low probability of vi-
olating the 3 per cent ceiling for overall defi-
cit, defined by the Stability Pact, is to be at-
tained.
4. The budgetary effort ultimately depends on
the violation probability one wants to admit.
For instance, a violation probability ranging
between 6 and 35 per cent up to year 2005
requires in the short run a budgetary effort
on the cyclically adjusted primary surplus
ranging between 0.8 and 1.8 per cent of
GDP, respectively. Obviously, other options
are feasible in our framework, including the
use of the European Community methodol-
ogy, which in general points to higher levels
of budgetary intervention required.
5. The required budgetary effort should con-
centrate in the near future, since this is the
period where the probability of exceeding
the threshold is higher, due to the initial
magnitude of the debt. It tend to decrease
gradually afterwards with the progressive
reduction of this magnitude. The need for
concentrating the fiscal effort mostly at the
beginning, together with the risks of an ini-
tial asymmetric recession are reasons that
suffice for an increased monitoring of the re-
cent and forthcoming fiscal developments,
as well as their articulation with the contri-
bution from privatisation revenues.
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Table 7
PROBABILITY OF OVERALL DEFICIT ABOVE 3%
Methodology of the Community for
calculating cyclical budget
Public debt (at steady-state) =20% GDP
b=02 .
2005 2015 2025
l=0 025 . 0.26 0.23 0.21
l=00 4 . 0.09 0.10 0.09
l=0 055 . 0.04 0.05 0.05
l=00 7 . 0.02 0.03 0.03
(27)By Community methodology we refer to the use of expression
(27) instead of (23). Rigorously, the procedure here presented
is different from the usual procedure of the European Commu-
nity, since in the present simulation the autocorrelation in the
cycle is taken into account.